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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case arises from the negligent care and treatment provided to Plaintiff H. Ray 
Harrison ("Mr. Harrison") by the Defendants in this matter. On April 28, 2004, Plaintiffs filed 
their complaint in this matter. The Complaint included claims for negligence against each of the 
Defendants regarding the care and treatment of Plaintiff H. Ray Harrison in November of 2003. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On November 21,2005, Harrison filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended 
Complaint to specifically allege a claim against Defendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, Inc. ("SARMC") for negligence in reappointing Dr. Jeffrey Hartford to its medical staff. 
R. Vol. I, p. 116. On December 5, 2005, SARMC filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Mr. 
Harrison's motion arguing that the motion should be denied because negligent credentialing is 
not a cognizable claim in Idaho. On January 17, 2006, Defendant Jeffrey Hartford, M.D. ("Dr. 
Hartford") filed a Motion for Protective Order requesting that the District Court prohibit 
Harrison from obtaining the exhibits to the Board of Medicine disciplinary hearing regarding the 
suspension of Dr. Hartford's license on the grounds that such exhibits included confidential and 
privileged records regarding substance abuse treatment. R. Vol. I, p. 132. Harrison opposed this 
Motion, R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 19, and, on April 3, 2006, the District Court entered an Order 
granting the Motion for Protective Order. R. Vol. I, p. 170. 
On May 18, 2006, the District Court entered an Order denying Harrison's Motion 
for Leave to File First Amended Complaint on the grounds that Idaho Code 5 39-1392c provided 
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absolute immunity to SARMC for any claim of negligence in the credentialing of Dr. Hartford. 
R. Vol. I, p. 183. Dr. Hartford ultimately entered into a settlement agreement with Harrison and 
was dismissed from this case. R. Vol. 11, p. 249. The remaining parties proceeded with litigation 
in this matter and, on April 27, 2007, Defendant D. Lee Binnion, M.D. ("Dr. Binnion") filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. 11, p. 264. Harrison opposed this Motion and on July 6, 
2007, the District Court granted summary judgment to Dr. Binnion on the grounds that 
Harrison's standard of care expert had failed to establish that he was familiar with the local 
standard of care and that Hanison had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding causation. R. Vol. 11, p. 280. 
On July 26, 2007, Harrison filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the District 
Court's decision granting summary judgment to Dr. Binnion. R. Vol. 11, p. 301. On September 
18, 2007, Harrison and SARMC filed a Stipulation for Dismissal of Harrison's remaining claims 
against SARMC. R. Vol. 11, p. 305. This stipulation expressly provided that Harrison was not 
precluded from appealing the District Court's decision regarding the negligent credentialing 
claim and dismissed all other claims against SARMC. On September 27, 2007, the District 
Court granted Harrison's motion for reconsideration regarding the standard of care expert, but 
denied the motion for reconsideration on the causation issue and, therefore, affirmed the grant of 
summary judgment to Dr. Binnion. R. Vol. 11, p. 3 10. Harrison timely filed the Notice of Appeal 
in this matter on October 30,2007. R. Vol. 11, p. 313. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
1. - Dr. Hartford has a profound historv with the Idaho Board o f  
Medicine relating to alcohol and drug abuse. 
Between 1995 and 1999, Dr. Hartford entered into three separate stipulated orders 
with the Board of Medicine resulting from his abuse of drugs and/or alcohol. See R. Vol. 11, p. 
326, Exhibit 12 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File 
First Amended Complaint), Exhibit A (Idaho Board of Medicine's Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Final Order), p. 12. The first order was entered in 1995, and 
violated by Dr. Hartford just two months later. See id. The second stipulation and order was 
entered in 1997 and was violated by Dr. Hartford in 1998. See id. The third stipulated order was 
entered in 1999 and, by Dr. Hartford's own admission, was repeatedly and continuously violated 
from 2001 until 2004. See id. 
In 1997, 1998, 2003 and 2004, Dr. Hartford also entered into contracts with the 
Idaho Medical Association's Physician Recovery Network ("PRN"). See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, 
Exhibit 12, Exhibit A, p. 3. In each of these contracts, Dr. Hartford admitted that he suffered 
from chemical dependency andlor mental conditions which impaired his ability to practice 
medicine safely. See id. See also R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit B (Idaho Board of 
Medicine's Proposed Findings and Conclusions of Law), 7 10. There is no dispute that Dr. 
I-Iartford broke the promises made in the 1997, 1998, and 2003 PRN contracts and failed to 
comply with the terms and conditions of those contracts. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, 
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Exhibit A, p. 3. Further, Dr. Hartford has admitted that, during all of his monitoring contracts 
with the Board, he never quit using alcohol. See id. 
2. - Dr. Hartford apalies for, and is granted, unrestricted privilezes 
to admit and treat patients within SARMC. 
In 200 1, Dr. Hartford applied for privileges with SARMC and appointment to its 
medical staff. See R. Vo1. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motions to Amend for Punitive Damages), Exhibit 3 (Deposition of Jeffrey Hartford, 
M.D.), p. 201, LL 5-22. At the time of his application, he was still subject to the Second 
Amended Stipulation and Order which was to remain in force for a minimum of five (5) years. 
See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit E (Second Amended Stipulation and Order), 1 VII. 
Dr. Hartford reapplied for privileges at SARMC and reappointment to its medical staff on 
February 25, 2003, in the course of the routine two-year reappointment cycle required by 
SARMC's Bylaws. See R. Vol. IT, p. 326, Exhibit 17, Exhibit 7 (SARMC's Supplemental 
Answers to Plaintiff's First Interrogatories), p. 2. When Dr. Hartford personally submitted his 
reappointment form, SARMC's Medical Staff Coordinator, Sherry Farnes, while leaning 
shoulder-to-shoulder with Dr. Hartford, smelled alcohol on Dr. Hartford's breath while 
discussing a question he had regarding the form. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit C 
(Board of Medicine transcript), p. 91, LL 1-12. At the time that Ms. Farnes observed the odor, 
Dr. Hartford was practicing with active privileges to admit and treat patients within the SARMC 
facility. 
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Ms. Farnes brought this information to her director, Kevin Hallman, who "took 
steps to talk to his supervisor". See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit C, p. 90, LL 7-22; p. 
95, line 1 - p. 96, line 3. Her director then instructed her to send an email to the PRN coordinator 
documenting her interaction with Dr. Hartford, which she did on March 6, 2003. See id. In 
response to Ms. Farnes e-mail dated March 6, 2003, the PRN required Dr. Hartford to seek an 
evaluation with the Palmetto Institute in Rayville, Louisiana. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, 
Exhibit B, 7 20. A report following the evaluation was sent from Palmetto to the PRN which was 
available and accessible to SARMC. See R. Vol. IT, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit C, p. 37, line 20 - 
p. 41, line 7. 
The Palmetto report, which was admitted as an exhibit in Dr. Hartford's public 
hearing relating to his licensure, indicated that Dr. Hartford needed a long-term intensive 
residential twelve-step program and medical management for depression. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, 
Exhibit 12, Exhibit B, 7 20. According to the record, Dr. Hartford never obtained such 
treatment. See id., 7 21. According to public record, the PaImetto report indicated that the 
evaluators did not believe Dr. Hartford was being truthful when he denied continuing to use 
alcohol and found his story to be rehearsed. See id., 7 20. Dr. Hartford's addiction evaluator, 
Dr. Charles C. Sledge, in describing Dr. Hartford's long history and dealings with the Idaho 
Board of Medicine, testified that Dr. Hartford's long history of relapse, lying to the Board of 
Medicine, deceiving health care providers, denying his use and addiction, and violation of his 
prior stipulations and Board Orders, despite terrible potential consequences was in no way 
surprising. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit A, p. 2. Nonetheless, SARMC granted Dr. 
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Hartford a full two-year reappointment to its medical staff and clinical privileges with no 
restrictions or monitoring in July 2003. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17, Exhibit 3 (Deposition 
of Dr. Jeffrey Hartford), p. 104, line 22 - p. 107, line 22 and p. 212, line 7 - p. 213, line 25. See 
also, R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit C, p. 97, line 16 - p. 98, line 5. 
3- Rav Harrison is admitted to SARMCS emevnencv room and is 
treated bv Dr. Binnion. 
At approximately 11:35 p.m. on November 14, 2003, Mr. Harrison visited the 
SARMC emergency room with symptoms of vomiting, diarrhea, poor balance, and dizziness. 
See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17, Exhibit 1 (Saint Alphonsus Medical Records), Bates Nos. 
000561-000568. Mr. Harrison was seen by Dr. Binnion. A blood chemistry lab test revealed 
that Mr. Harrison had a life-threatening sodium level of 96 mEqlL. See id at Bates Nos. 000234, 
000561-000568, 000721. Dr. Binnion started an IV of normal saline at 20 mcqKcllL at 200 
cclhr in the ER. See id. at Bates Nos. 000561-000568; 000647. Additionally, Dr. Binnion 
specifically noted that "I think that his sodium has taken quite some time to get this low, and I do 
not want to replace it too quickly as that could cause cerebral edema." See id. at Bates No. 
000562. Dr. Binnion also ordered a "them.-7" blood chemistry panel to be performed every six 
hours to assist the attending physician in monitoring and controlling the rate of sodium 
replacement. See id. 
Dr. Binnion then spoke with Dr. Hartford who was identified by SARMC as the 
admitting physician for Mr. Harrison's regular physician, Dr. Michael Minas, and, following that 
conversation, Mr. Harrison was admitted to the hospital. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17, 
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Exhibit 2 (Deposition of D. Lee Binnion, M.D.), p. 104, LL 13-21. See also R. Vol. 11, p. 326, 
Exhibit 17, Exhibit 1, Bates Nos. 000561-000562. At approximately 3:26 a.m. on November 15, 
2003, Mr. Harrison was admitted to SARMC's orthopedics floor. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 
17, Exhibit 1, Bates Nos. 000567-000568. 
On November 15, 2003, Dr. Hartford assumed the care and treatment of Mr. 
Harrison as the on-call attending physician. That morning, Plaintiff Julie Harrison ("Mrs. 
Harrison") met with Dr. Hartford regarding the treatment of Mr. Harrison and smelled alcohol on 
Dr. Hartford. R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17, Exhibit 4 (Deposition of Julie Harrison), p. 105, line 
6 - p. 106, line 13. Mrs. Harrison also smelled alcohol on Dr. Hartford on Monday, November 
1 7 ' ~  and Wednesday, November 19'~. See id. During the course of Dr. Hartford's care and 
treatment of Mr. Harrison, Mr. Harrison's sodium level was allowed to rise at a rate twice the 
minimm standard of care which, in turn, resulted in Mr. Harrison contracting Central Pontine 
Myelinolysis (CPM) - a severe neurological injury to Mr. I-Iarrison's brain stem. See R. Vol. 11, 
p. 326, Exhibit I4 (Affidavit of Richard Stems, M.D.). Mr. Harrison suffered permanent 
neurological damage. See id. 
11. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Harrison's Motion for Leave to 
File First Amended Complaint to assert a cause of action for negligence in the credentialing and 
privileging of Dr. Hartford? 
2. Did the District Court e n  in granting the Motion for Protective Order 
regarding the discovery of the exhibits to the Idaho Board of Medicine's disciplinary hearing 
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regarding Dr. Hartford's medical license and prohibiting Mr. Harrison from obtaining those 
exhibits to the extent they included information regarding Dr. Hartford's substance abuse 
treatment? 
3. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Dr. Binnion 
on the issue of causation? 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
Generally, the Court will review a grant or denial of a motion to amend pleadings 
under an abuse of discretion standard. "The grant or denial of leave to amend after a responsive 
pleading has been filed is a matter that is within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to 
reversal on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion." Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., v. 
Idaho First Nat'l Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991). However, where 
the grant or denial was made purely upon a conclusion of law by the lower court, the decision is 
non-binding on this Court and the Court exercises free review over that conclusion of law. See 
Suitts v. First Security Bank ofldaho, MA., 110 Idaho 15,23, 713 P.2d 1374, 1382 (1985). 
"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of 
review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motio~l for summary 
judgment." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm., 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 
641,644 (2006). Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that 
summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admission on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
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and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law[.]" "All disputed facts are 
to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can 
be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Robert Cornstock, 
LLC v. Keybank Nat'l Assoc., 142 Idaho 568, 130 P.3d 1106 (2006). 
B. The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Harrison's Motion for Leave 
to File First Amended Complaint to Assert a Cause of Action for 
Negligence in the Credentiuling and Privileging of Dr. Hartford. 
As was set forth in the Course of Proceedings, on November 15, 2005, Mr. 
Harrison filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. With the Motion, Harrison 
sought to amend the complaint to specifically assert a cause of action for negligence against 
SARMC for the improper credentialing and privileging of Dr. Hartford. After briefing and oral 
argument, the District Court issued a decision on May 18,2006 denying the motion based on the 
District Court's legal conclusion that Idaho Code 5 39-1392c provided complete immunity to 
SARMC for the credentialing and privileging of any physician. See R. Vol. I, p. 183. The Court 
exercises free review over the District Court's decision because the District Court's decision was 
a conclusion of law regarding the legal effect of Idaho Code 5 39-1392c. See Suitts, 110 Idaho at 
23, 713 P.2d at 1382 (1985). For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Harrison respectfully asserts 
that the District Court's decision was in error and requests that the Court reverse this decision 
and allow Mr. Harrison to proceed to trial against SARMC on this issue. 
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1. - The obligution o f  an acute care hospital to use reasonable care in 
the credentialing and privileaina o f  physicians is supported by 
important public policy o f  this state. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has long followed the rule that "'one owes the duty to 
every person in society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation 
in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result 
in such injury."' See Doe v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 581, 961 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1998), citing 
Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980). The Court has further 
recognized that there is a "general rule that each person has a duty of care to prevent 
unreasonable, foreseeable rislcs of harm to others." See Doe, 131 Idaho at 581,961 P.2d at 1184, 
citing Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990). Certainly, the 
failure to use reasonable care in the credentialing and privileging of physicians treating patients 
at SARMC could be reasonably anticipated to cause harm to such patients. As such, a cause of 
action for negligent credentialing falls squarely within Idaho's negligence precedent. 
Courts from other jurisdictions have expressly recognized causes of action for 
negligent credentialing. For example, in Greenwood v. Wierdsma, the Wyoming Supreme Court 
noted that a duty to exercise reasonable care in the extension and continuation of medical staff 
privileges had been recognized in other states. See 741 P.2d 1079, 1087 (Wyo. 1987) citing 51 
A.L.R. 31d 981 and 12 A . L . R . ~ ' ~  57. The Wyoming Court then noted that one of the hospital's 
"'primary functions is to screen its staff of physicians to 'insure' that only competent physicians 
are allowed to practice in the hospital."' See id. at 1088 (quoting Johnson v. Misericordia 
Community Hospital, 294 N.W.2d 501, 512 (Wis. 1980)). In turn, such a requirement "amounts 
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to a legal duty imposed on hospitals to exercise that degree of care and skill usually exercised or 
maintained by other reputable hospitals in the extension or continuation of medical staff 
privileges." See id. See also R. Vol. I, p. 178-80. 
SARMC's duty to exercise reasonable care in the credentialing and privileging of 
Dr. Hartford is further set forth in the hospital accreditation standards established by the hospital 
industry. In its 2005 Comprehensive Accreditation Manual for Hospitals (CAMH), the Official 
Handbook, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) 
Leadership Standard LD.l.10 states, "The hospital has governance with ultimate responsibility 
and legal authority for the safety and quality of care, treatment, and services." Similar language 
is also contained in the 2003 CAMH for Governing Body Standard G0.2 which was in effect at 
the time of Dr. Hartford's 2003 reappointment to S A W ' S  medical staff: "The hospital's 
governing body or authority ultimately is responsible for the quality of care the hospital 
provides." See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 15 (Affidavit of Kathleen Matzka), Exhibit 2. In 
addition, Medical Staff standard M.S. 2 in JCAHO's 2003 CAMH states, "Each medical staff 
develops and adopts bylaws and rules and regulations to establish a framework for self- 
governance of medical staff activities and accountability to the governing body." See R. Vol. 11, 
p. 326, Exhibit 15 (Affidavit of Kathleen Matzka), Exhibit 3, pp. 1-3. 
Similarly, the Idaho Administrative Code, IDAPA 16.03.14 - Rules and Minimum 
Health and Welfare / Division of Welfare Standards for Hospitals in Idaho, states, "[Tlhere shall 
be an organized governing body, or equivalent, that has ultimate authority and responsibility for 
the operation of the hospital." The Medicare Conditions of Participation 5 482.22(b) Standard: 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 11 
Medical Staff Organization and Accountability, states, "The medical staff must be well organized 
and accountable to the governing body for the quality of the medical care provided to the 
patients." See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 15, 7 12. Finally, the Medicare Conditions of 
Participation 3 482.12 Condition of Participation: Governing Body, states, "The hospital must 
have an effective governing body legally responsible for the conduct of the hospital as an 
institution." See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 15, 7 13. Thus, it is clear that the hospital 
accreditation standards, as well as state and federal regulations for hospitals, recognize that 
SARMC has ultimate authority and responsibility for the medical care provided within SARMC's 
facility. Such responsibility necessarily and expressly includes the ultimate responsibility for 
credentialing and privileging only qualified medical services providers. 
Finally, SARMC's duty is also recognized by its own bylaws. Specifically, 
Section 5:l of SARMC's Hospital Bylaws states, "The Board of Trustees shall have final 
responsibility for (i) appointment and reappointment of the members of the MedicalIDental staff 
and delineation of their staff privileges (ii) taking such corrective action relating to 
MedicalIDental staff members as it deems appropriate[.]" See R. Val. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, 
Exhibit D (SARMC Policies and Bylaws), p. 8. Therefore, absent immunity granted by law, it is 
clear that SARMC owed a duty of care to Mr. Harrison in the credentialing and privileging of Dr. 
Hartford. As will be set forth below, no such immunity exists for SARMC under the facts of this 
case. 
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2. - Idaho Code 6 39-1392c does not provide immunilv from negligent 
credentialing claims. 
In the Order denying Mr. Harrison's Motion to Amend, the District Court relied 
upon the immunity provisions within the Idaho Peer Review Act ("Act"), I.C. 5 39-1392, et. seq. 
Specifically, the District Court relied upon Idaho Code 5 39-1392c which provides, in pertinent 
part: 
The furnishing of information or provision of opinions to any 
health care organization or the receiving and use of such 
information and opinions shall not subject any health care 
organization or other person to any liability or action for money 
damages or other legal or equitable relief. 
The District Court held that this statute provides that no person or organization can be held 
civilly liable for the "use" of "information or opinions" that are a part of peer review activities, 
including credentialing. See R. Vol. I, pp. 190-192. The District Court further concluded that 
because "the act of issuing the credential is the ultimate use of credentialing material" the statute 
provides complete and absolute immunity against any and all claims of negligence relating to the 
credential of a physician. See R. Vol. I, p. 190. In support of this holding, the District Court 
noted that "[tlhe language recently added to the Idaho Code makes the act of credentialing a peer 
review activity subject to immunity. 'Peer review activities by a health care organization 
include, without limitation: Credentialing, privileging or affiliating of health care providers as 
members of, or providers for, a health care organization."' See R. Vol. I, p. 190 (citing I.C. $ 39- 
1392a(ll)). 
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Mr. Harrison does not dispute that the Idaho Peer Review Statute was amended to 
include credentialing and privileging as part of "peer review activities." However, the immunity 
provision set forth in Idaho Code 5 39-1392c does not provide immunity for "peer review 
activities." Rather, the provision provides immunity for furnishing or providing information or 
the use of information provided to a health care organization. If the legislature intended to 
provide absolute immunity to hospitals for all decisions made in the course of peer review 
activities, it would have simply amended Idaho Code 5 39-1392c to clearly provide for such 
immunity. I-Iowever, it did not do so. Thus, the question before this Court is whether the 
District Court properly interpreted Idaho Code 5 39-1392c as providing an absolute immunity for 
hospitals from civil liability for failing to exercise reasonable care in the credentialing and 
privileging of physicians on its medical staff. 
As the District Court noted in the Order denying Mr. Harrison's Motion to 
Amend, when called upon to interpret a statute, the Court begins with an examination of the 
literal words. See Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Lisby, 126 Idaho 776, 779, 890 P.2d 727, 730 
(1995). The Court must give the language of a statute its plain, obvious and rational meaning. 
See State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). The Court's primary 
function is to determine and give effect to legislative intent. Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 
266, 92 P.3d 514, 516 (2004). Such intent should be derived from reading the whole act. 
George W: Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 
(1990). 
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Despite the District Court's holding that Idaho Code 5 39-1392c provides 
complete immunity to a hospital for claim of negligent credentialing, the literal words of the 
statute, as well as the intent derived from the whole Act, simply do not support that 
interpretation. Mr. Harrison is not seeking to hold SARMC liable for furnishing, receiving, or 
any particular information in their credentialing process. Rather, Mr. Harrison is seeking 
to hold SARMC liable for negligence for its decision to grant hospital privileges to Dr. Hartford. 
Under the District Court's overly broad interpretation of Idaho Code 5 39-1392c, a doctor could 
insulate himself from liability simply by instituting a peer review proceeding prior to making his 
treatment decision. It could not have been the intent of the Idaho Legislature to allow hospitals 
and doctors to escape liability for negligence simply by providing some information about the 
patient or physician to a peer review or credentialing committee. 
Further, the District Court's interpretation of Idaho Code 5 39-1 392c as providing 
immunity for &l negligent credentialing claims is unsupported by the literal words and very 
definitions within the Act when the statute is read as a whole. Idaho Code 5 39-1392c protects 
health care organizations, including hospitals, from "use" of "such information." As is clear 
from a reading of the whole Act, the information protected by Idaho Code 5 39-1392c is the 
information defined within Idaho Code $5 39-1392b and 39-1392a(12). These statutes 
demonstrate that the Act protects "all peer review" records which, in turn, is defined as "all 
evidence of interviews, reports, statements, minutes, memoranda, notes, investigative graphs and 
compilations and the contents thereof, and all physical materials relating to peer review of any 
health care organization." See LC. $5 39-1392b and 39-1392a(12). Thus, at best, the Act only 
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protects a hospital from being sued for using "interviews, reports, statements, minutes, 
memoranda, notes, investigative graphs and compilations and the contents thereof, and all 
physical materials relating to peer review." In this case, Mr. Harrison is not seeking to sue 
SARMC for using any of those items. Nothing in the proposed amended complaint sought to 
hold SARMC liable for the use of any particular document, interview, statement, or other 
"protected peer review information." Rather, Mr. Harrison is seeking to hold SARMC liable for 
the decision it made to provide hospital privileges to Dr. Hartford. And, as is discussed more 
fully below, the information upon which Mr. Harrison's claim is based is information that is 
publicly available from the Idaho Board of Medicine and, therefore, is not "protected peer review 
information." 
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the important distinction. If a patient learned 
that a physician on the medical staff of a hospital was not licensed in Idaho based upon 
information publicly available from the Board of Medicine and then sued the hospital for 
allowing that physician to provide care and treatment at the hospital's facility, the hospital could 
not reasonably argue that it was being sued for "using" protected peer review information 
provided to a peer review committee. Rather, the immunity for the "use of' information as 
contemplated by Idaho Code 5 39-1392c is clearly there to provide a hospital immunity for 
relying upon statements or opinions provided to the hospital which may prove to be false or 
otherwise unworthy of such reliance. Additionally, as is discussed in detail, infra, the purpose of 
the immunity provision was to encourage the free exchange of ideas and information within and 
between hospitals. Thus, by the plain language of the statute, Idaho Code 3 39-1392c does not 
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protect hospitals from liability for its privileging and credentialing decisions. As such, SARMC 
is not immune from such a claim. 
3. - Idaho Code 6 39-1392c is, at best, ambiguous as to the extent o f  
immunity wanted and the legislative historv does not support the 
District Court's interaretation. 
Idaho Code 5 39-1392c does not "unambiguously" provide immunity to hospitals 
from liability for credentialing and privileging decisions. The statute is, at best, ambiguous as to 
the extent of the immunity provided. A statute is ambiguous where reasonable minds might 
differ or be uncertain as to its meaning. See State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271,92 P.3d 521 (2004). In 
this case, the statute does not expressly mention credentialing decisions or even peer review 
activities as being immune from any suit and makes no mention of absolute immunity. It 
unambiguously provides immunity for furnishing or providing information or opinions to any 
health care organization or for receiving or using such information or opinions. However, the 
statute does not define any of the key terms, particularly what constitutes "use oP' information or 
opinions. Certainly, the statute is reasonably subject to differing interpretations regarding the 
extent of immunity provided. 
If a statute is ambiguous, the Court may look beyond the plain language of the 
statute to ascertain the legislative intent. See Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreillle Sch. Dist. No. 84, 
142 Idaho 804, 134 P.3d 655 (2006). "When a statute is ambiguous, 'it must be construed to 
mean what the legislature intended it to mean. To determine that intent, we examine not only the 
literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public 
policy behind the statute, and its legislative history"' I-layden Lake Fire Prof. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 
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Idaho 388,398-99, 11 1 P.3d 73,83-84 (2005) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360,362,79 
P.3d 719,721 (2003)) (emphasis added). 
Here, the District Court's decision that Idaho Code 5 39-1392c provides absolute 
immunity for all credentialing and privileging activities is not supported by the legislative history 
of the Idaho peer review statute. This statute was first enacted in 1973 and included the grants of 
immunity for the furnishing of information or provision of opinions as well as the receiving and 
use of such information and opinions that currently exist in Idaho Code 5 39-1392c. The 
Statement of Purpose which accompanied House Bill 136 stated, in part, "[The bill] would also 
encourage the free exchange of information in such proceedings by granting civil immunity to 
persons providing information or opinions to such review and study committees." Statement of 
Purpose for H.B. 136 (1973). The 1973 version of the peer review statute included the 
exemption from civil liability for those furnishing information and opinions and those receiving 
and using such information and opinions. 1973 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 265, p. 547. Thus, the 
legislative history clearly demonstrates that the grant of civil immunity was intended for the 
purpose of "encouraging the free exchange of information" not for the purpose of exempting a 
hospital from any duty to properly privilege and re-credential doctors performing surgical 
procedures at the hospital. 
In 2003, the peer review statute was amended and those amendments included 
changes to both the definition of "peer review activities" and the civil immunity provision. The 
definition of peer review activities was amended to include "credential, privileging, or affiliating 
health care providers as members of, or providers for, a health care organization." I.C. 5 39- 
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1392a(9)(a). The changes to the civil immunity provision were largely cosmetic and did not 
provide additional immunities not already in the statute. C$ I.C. 5 39-1392c (2002) with I.C. 5 
39-1392c (2003). Rather, the statute retained the immunity for furnishing and providing or 
receiving and using information or opinions. See id. The District Cout held that the inclusion 
of credentialing and privileging in the definition of peer review activities demonstrates the 
legislature's intent to exempt a hospital from any liability for negligent credentialing. R. Vol. I, 
p. 191. However, this argument is not supported by the legislative intent set forth in the 
legislative history of the 2003 amendments. The Statement of Purpose accompanying Senate Bill 
1102 indicates the purpose was to "clearly define key terminology," "delineate[] the 
circumstances upon which records lawfully may be released," and "clarifCy] immunity from civil 
liability." See Statement of Purpose of S.B. 1102 (2003). The fact that no substantial changes 
were made to the civil immunity provision and the legislative history of that provision indicates 
that the purpose of that provision remains as it was when initially enacted, to "encourage the free 
exchange of information in such proceedings by granting civil immunity to persons providing 
information or opinions to such review and study committees." Statement of Purpose for H.B. 
136 (1973). Certainly, nothing in the legislative history of the 2003 amendments evidences 
intent to abrogate an entire cause of action. 
Nothing in Idaho Code 5 39-1392c references immunity for acts or determinations 
made during the course of peer review activities. The legislative history of the provision 
demonstrates that the immunities that are provided by that section are provided for the purpose 
of encouraging the "free exchange of information." Additionally, the legislative history indicates 
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that this provision was intended to allow hospitals to share findings with one another. See House 
Health and Welfare Committee Meeting minutes (HB 136), p.2, February 14, 1973. As was set 
forth previously, Harrison has not sued SARMC for using or receiving any particular information 
or opinions in their credentialing activities. Rather, Harrison has sued SARMC for failing to 
exercise reasonable care in its decision to credential Dr. Hartford. Thus, based on the language 
of the statute as well as the legislative intent behind the statute, the District Court's decision that 
Idaho Code 5 39-1392c provides absolute immunity to hospitals for all credentialing decisions 
must be reversed. 
4. - The common law cause o f  action for nealiaent credentialing 
cannot be abrogated by doubtful imalication. 
The District Court further held the Legislature's power to abrogate a common law 
cause of action also supported the interpretation that Idaho Code 5 39-1392c provides absolute 
immunity for all credentialing decisions. R. Vol. I, p. 199. This Court has held that the 
legislature may abrogate a common law cause of action. See, e.g., Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 
594, 607, 151 P.2d 765, 771 (1944) overruled on other grounds by Doggett v. Boiler Eng'g & 
Supply Co., 93 Idaho 888, 477 P.2d 511 (1970); Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 97 Idaho 859, 555 
P.2d 399 (1976). However, the rules of common law carniot be changed by doubtful implication. 
,Tee Moon, 65 Idaho at 607, 151 P.2d at 771. Thus, it is the province of the legislature, not the 
courts, to abrogate the common law. See id. Here, there is no clear statement of legislative 
intent to eliminate the common law cause of action for negligent credentialing. Had the 
Legislature intended to abrogate such a cause of action, the Legislature would have enacted a 
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specific provision clearly providing that a hospital was not civilly liable for its decisions in 
granting or denying hospital privileges to any physician. However, they did not do so. To the 
contrary, they made only cosmetic changes to the civil immunity provision. Therefore, at best, 
the 2003 amendments to the Idaho peer review statute create immunity from liability for 
negligent credentialing claims by implication. I-Iowever, as was clearly set forth by this Court, 
such an implication is insufficient to support a finding that the Legislature intended to abrogate 
the common law. See Moon, 65 Idaho at 607,15 1 P.2d at 771 
This conclusion is supported by case law from other jurisdictions. For example, 
in Browning v. Burt, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a hospital's argument that the civil 
immunities provision in the Ohio Peer Review Act created a complete immunity for a hospital 
against any claims for negligent credentialing. 613 N.E.2d 993 (1993). In so holding, the Ohio 
Court reviewed Ohio's statute which provided that "No hospital, no state or local society, and no 
individual who is a member or employee of any of the following committees shall be liable in 
damages to any person for any acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct within the scope of 
the functions of the committee[.]" See Ohio Rev. Code 52305.25. In rejecting the hospital's 
claim that this statute provided immunity against negligent credentialing claims, the Ohio Court 
noted that: 
The purposes of R.C. 2305.25 are clear. The statute extends 
limited protection to those who provide information to certain 
review boards and committees to encourage the free flow of 
information without threat of reprisal in the form of civil 
liability. See, generally, Jacobs v. Frank (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 
11 1, 113, 573 N.E.2d 609, 612. The statute also seeks to protect 
those serving on committees and committee employees for the 
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obvious reason that it could he difficult to staff a committee absent 
such protections. However, the cases at bar do not involve a 
situation where [St. Elizabeth Medical Center] has been either the 
provider of information to a committee (see, e.g., R.C. 1742.141), 
or the participant on a committee. It is clear to us that R.C. 
2305.25 does not provide blanket immunity to a hospital for 
negligence in granting and/or continuing staff privileges of an 
incompetent physician. 
Browning, 613 N.E.2d at 1007 (emphasis added). It is important to note that the Ohio immunity 
statute is significantly broader than that found in the Idaho peer review statute. Specifically, the 
Ohio statute did provide for immunity for "acts, omissions, decisions and other conduct" within 
the scope of the functions of the committee, while Idaho's statute only provides immunity for 
providing, receiving, and using protected peer review records. Cf: Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.25 
with LC. 5 39-1392c (2003). Despite the broadly worded immunity provision within the Ohio 
peer review statute, the Ohio Court acknowledged the clear legislative purpose behind the 
immunity provision and fiuther recognized that the grant of immunity was not intended to 
provide hospitals with blanket immunity in granting or continuing the privileges of an 
unqualified physician. 
Based on the legislative history of Idaho Code § 39-1392c, the purpose of the 
Idaho statute is substantially similar to the purpose of the Ohio immunity statute, and as noted, 
the Idaho statute's immunity is much narrower than that granted in the Ohio statute. The 
legislative history of both statutes demonstrates that they were enacted to provide for the free 
exchange of information between hospitals and peer review participants. Nothing in the statutes 
supports the idea that they were enacted to provide hospitals immunity from any liability from 
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negligent credentialing claims. The Ohio Court of Appeals reiterated this holding in Phillips v. 
~ u r t ' ,  1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2418 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) and expressly found that the Ohio 
statute did not provide immunity even if the hospital provided information or was a member of a 
protected committee. See id. at 29-33. The Ohio Court of Appeals articulated the policy behind 
their refusal to expand the hospital's immunity, stating: 
SEMC's view would impede, not further, the policy underlying 
immunity. Rather than promoting improved health care, shielding 
hospitals from liability for negligent peer review would remove an 
important incentive to ensure that they credential only qualified 
physicians who will offer patients only appropriate medical 
treatment. . . . . Permitting a hospital to cloak itself with 
immunity from all actions arising from its conduct within the 
peer review process, when its negligence may lead to "an 
unreasonable risk of harm or injury" to patients, is 
incongruous with the goal of enhancing medical care. We do 
not believe that is what the legislature or the Court had in mind. 
Phillips, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS, at 32-34 (emphasis added). 
Based on the clear legislative history behind the creation of Idaho Code § 39- 
1392c, as well as established Idaho case law which disfavors abrogation of common law claims 
by implication, Mr. I-Iarrison respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District Court's 
decision that Idaho Code 3 39-1392c provides complete immunity to the hospital from any 
claims for negligent credentialing. 
'Harrison recognizes that Phillips v. Burt is an unpublished decision from the Ohio Court of Appeals. However, as 
all out of state decisions are simply offered as persuasive, non-binding, authority, Harrison respectfully requests that 
the Court treat the unpublished decision in the same manner. See, e.g., Hyde v. Fisher, 143 Idaho 782, 785, 152 
P.3d 653, 656 (Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing that an unpublished decision from the United States District Couit for 
the District of Idaho did not stand as authority, but adopting the rationale from that unpublished decision). 
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5. - The Idaho Peer Review privilege provisions do not provide 
immunity fvom neglnlipent credentialing claims. 
In the proceedings below, SARMC argued that, in addition to the immunity 
provided by Idaho Code 3 39-1392c, the Idaho appellate courts would not recognize a cause of 
action for negligent credentialing because the Idaho Peer Review statute provides for the 
confidentiality of hospital's credential decisions. However, the Idaho Peer Review statute does 
not provide for confidentiality of a credentialing decision because such decision is apparent 
when a physician is practicing at SARMC's facility. To say that a decision is confidential when 
it is clear that a physician has been granted privileges by the physician providing care within 
SARMC's facility is nonsensical. Rather, the plain language of the Idaho Peer Review statute 
protects "all peer review" which, in turn, is defined as "all evidence of interviews, 
reports, statements, minutes, memoranda, notes, investigative graphs and compilations and the 
contents thereof, and all physical materials relating to peer review of any health care 
organization." I.C. 33 39-1392b and 39-1392a(12). Thus, contrary to SARMC's argument, not 
all information relating to peer review is privileged. 
In this case, there is substantial evidence and information to support a negligent 
credentialing case without obtaining or relying upon protected peer review information. 
Specifically, Harrison intends to present evidence available in the public record from the Idaho 
Board of Medicine. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibits A, B, C and E. This evidence 
includes transcripts, exhibits, proposed findings, findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
amended findings of fact and conclusions of law from the Idaho Board of Medicine's Board 
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S t a f s  Petition for Violations and Enforcement of Orders hearing held on May 14 and May 26, 
2004. See id. Such evidence demonstrates that Dr. Hartford had entered into three separate 
stipulated orders with the Board of Medicine between 1995 and 1999. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, 
Exhibit 12, Exhibit A, p. 2-3. The first order was entered in 1995, and violated by Dr. Hartford 
just two months later. See id The second stipulation and order was entered in 1997 and was 
violated by Dr. Hartford in 1998. See id. The third stipulated order was entered in 1999 and, by 
Dr. Hartford's own admission, was repeatedly and continuously violated from 2001 until 2004. 
See id. 
The evidence further demonstrates that "[fjor nine years [Dr. Hartford was] given 
every opportunity to achieve sobriety but failed over and over again. No treatment, program or 
contract, before his recent treatment . . . has been successful. There is no serious dispute with 
regard to [Dr. Hartford's] medical condition, history of drug and alcohol abuse, resulting 
consequences thereof, and that [Dr. Hartford] has suffered multiple and damaging relapses in his 
treatment." Id. at 3. 
In 1997, 1998, 2003 and 2004, Dr. Hartford entered into contracts with the Idaho 
Medical Association's Physician Recovery Network ("PRN"). See id. at p. 3. In each of these 
contracts, Dr. Hartford admitted that he suffered from chemical dependency and/or mental 
conditions which impaired his ability to practice medicine safely. See id See also R. Vol. 11, p. 
326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit B, 1 10. On August 12, 1998, the Board received a report that Dr. 
Hartford had tested positive for marijuana use on July 28, 1998, and August 5, 1998. See id. at 1 
10. The Board of Medicine's staff investigated the matter and obtained patient calendars from 
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Dr. Hartford showing that Dr. Hartford was seeing and treating patients on each of those two 
dates when he tested positive for marijuana. See id. There is no dispute that Dr. Hartford broke 
the promises made in the 1997, 1998, and 2003 PRN contracts and failed to comply with the 
terms and conditions of those contracts. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit A, p. 3. 
Further, Dr. Hartford has admitted that, during all of his monitoring contracts with the Board, he 
never quit using alcohol. See id. 
The evidence from the Board of Medicine proceedings also includes testimony 
from Sherry Fames, the credentialing coordinator of SARMC, who testified that in early March 
2003, she was leaning shoulder to shoulder with Dr. Hartford reviewing his re-appointment 
application when she smelled alcohol on his breath. See R. Vot. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit B, 
7 1 8  See also R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit C. Ms. Farnes reported this incident to the 
PRN program, but SARMC failed to require or request a laboratory test from Dr. Hartford to 
confirm the presence of alcohol. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit B, 7 18. 
Following this report to the PRN program, Dr. Hartford underwent a five-day 
assessment at the Palmetto Addiction Recovery Center, Inc. See id., 7 20. The assessment by 
the clinical psychologist indicated that that testing "does not lead one to believe his story." See 
id. The assessment recommended a long-term intensive residential program and medical 
treatment for depression. See id. The assessment further recommended psychiatric group 
therapy and medical management of Dr. Hartford's depression by an Idaho PRN approved 
psychiatrist. See id. The Board of Medicine documents and testimony further demonstrate that 
Dr. Hartford admitted that he began drinking again in 2001 and did not stop until he was 
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admitted for treatment in January of 2004. See id., 7 24-25. Mr. Harrison will produce evidence 
that despite this information and these recommendations, SARMC granted Dr. Hartford full and 
unrestricted reappointment in July of 2003. Mr. Harrison will also produce expert testimony 
that, given the public information available to SARMC at the time of the reappointment 
application and decision, SARMC's reappointment of Dr. Hartford in 2003 was negligent under 
any circumstances. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 15,147. 
Additional evidence that is not protected peer review information and which is 
available to Mr. Harrison includes SARMC's own credentialing policies. Under these policies, a 
physician must have an unrestricted license to practice medicine. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 
12, Exhibit D. However, it is undisputed in this case that Dr. Hartford's license was not 
mestricted at the time of his reappointment in March 2003. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, 
Exhibit A, p. 3. Rather, at the time of SARMC's granting of privileges to Dr. Hartford in 2001 
and the reappointment in 2003, Dr. Hartford's license was conditioned upon his coinpliance with 
the Second Amended Stipulation and Order entered into by Dr. Hartford in 1999. 
Additionally, SARMC's medical staff bylaws (Section 3.A.l I) and Policies and 
Plans, require, as a minimum qualification that must be met by all applicants to the Medical staff 
before an application will be processed and continually, thereafter, a minimum of $1 million of 
medical malpractice insurance coverage and to file with the Office of Medical Affairs a copy of 
all such policies and endorsements. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit D, 9 3.A.l I.  
SARMC's reappointment application specifically requires the physician to identify any 
"conditions" related to the policy. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit D, 7 10(f). Despite 
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Dr. Hartford's long history of alcohol and drug abuse and repeated violation of Idaho Board of 
Medicine Orders and PRN contracts, SARMC reappointed Dr. Hartford to its staff with a 
"Lloyds of London" insurance policy with a "condition" that specifically voided the policy upon 
violation by Dr. Hartford of any of the terms of his Second Amended Stipulation and Order 
including the provision requiring complete abstinence from the consumption of alcohol or drugs. 
See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17, Exhibit 6 (Insurance Policy), p. JH 18. 
Thus, evidence unprotected by the peer review privilege and either publicly 
available or discoverable in the course of litigation conclusively demonstrates that SARMC 
violated its own policies when granting Dr. Hartford's reappointment application in March 2003. 
Therefore, as set forth above, Mr. Harrison has more than sufficient evidence to support a cause 
of action for negligence in the privileging and credentialing of Dr. Hartford against SARMC 
without using any documents protected by the peer review privilege. 
SARMC asserted to the District Court that it must be immune from a negligent 
credentialing claim because the privilege has no meaning if SARMC is forced to divulge 
privileged information to defend a claim of negligence in the credentialing and privileging of a 
physician. However, nothing in Mr. Harrison's claim requires SARMC to divulge protected peer 
review records (i.e. all evidence of interviews, reports, statements, minutes, memoranda, notes, 
investigative graphs and compilations and the contents thereof, and all physical materials relating 
to peer review of any health care organization) in order to defend against a negligent 
credentialing claim. SARMC can present evidence about its general procedures and policies for 
reappointment, as well as presenting testimony of its own experts that based on the evidence 
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presented by Mr. Harrison, it was reasonable to grant privileges to Dr. Hartford. Certainly, the 
expert can testify as to the reasonableness of SARMC's decision without discussing privileged 
documents or revealing discussions which occurred during the credentialing process. Therefore, 
allowing a claim against a hospital for negligence in the credentialing and privileging of a 
physician does not abrogate the privilege set forth in the Idaho peer review statute. 
Further, based on the language of the peer review statute, the privilege relating to 
protected peer review information belongs to SARMC and, like any other privilege, SARMC is 
free to waive that privilege if necessary to defend against a claim. In the event SARMC or any 
other hospital is faced with a lawsuit for negligent credentialing based on publicly available and 
discoverable information and believes that it can only defend such a lawsuit by presenting 
evidence protected by the peer review privilege, it can waive the privilege. This is no different 
than a defendant who believes that his best defense requires submission of information protected 
by the attorney client privilege to the court. No party can compel that information from the 
defendant, but the defendant is free to waive the privilege if he so chooses. There is simply no 
reason that SARMC should be given greater protections for the peer review privilege than exist 
for any other privilege recognized by law. 
In fact, several courts have found that the establishment of confidentiality for peer 
review records did not abrogate a cause of action for negligent credentialing. For example, in 
Greenwood, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987), the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether the Wyoming privilege statute eliminated any cause of action for negligent 
credentialing. 741 P.2d at 1087. In answering this question, the Wyoming Court first reviewed 
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the relevant statute and found that the statute precluded discovery of "all reports, findings, 
proceedings and data of such hospital medical staff committees." Id. (quoting W.S. 5 35-2-602 
(1977)). The Court ffurther observed that "hospital staff committees" included "any committee 
within a hospital, consisting of medical staff members or hospital personnel, which is engaged in 
supervision, discipline, admission, privileges or control ol' members of the hospital's medical 
staff[.]" Id. (quoting W.S. 5 35-2-604 (1977)). Thus, the Court concluded, the statutes clearly 
covered accreditation activities under the privilege. 
Despite the fact that the statute excluded accreditation activities from discovery in 
a civil suit, the Court nevertheless concluded that the statute did not abrogate a common law 
claim for negligent accreditation against the hospital. In so holding, the Court first noted that a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in the extension and continuation of medical staff privileges had 
been recognized in other states. See id. (citing 51 A.L.R. 3rd 981 and 12 A.L.R.~"' 57). The 
Court then noted that one of the hospital's "'primary functions is to screen its staff of physicians 
to 'insure' that only competent physicians are allowed to practice in the hospital."' Id. at 1088 
(quoting Johnson v. Misericordia Comm. Hosp., 294 N.W.2d 501, 512 (Wis. 1980)). In turn, 
such a requirement "amounts to a legal duty imposed on hospitals to exercise that degree of care 
and skill usually exercised or maintained by other reputable hospitals in the extension or 
continuation of medical staff privileges." Greenwood, 741 P.2d at 1088. 
Having found an affirmative duty to reasonably extend or continue medical staff 
privileges, the Court then noted that "[ilf the legislature had wanted to prohibit actions against 
hospitals for breaching their duties to properly supervise the qualifications and privileges of their 
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medical staffs, it would have done so expressly. We will not construe the privilege statute to 
impliedly prohibit this category of negligence actions." Id. In support of its holding, the Court 
noted that the "continued availability and vitality of such causes of action serve an important 
public policy - the preservation of quality health care for the citizens of this state." Id. Lastly, 
the Court concluded that although the privilege statute was broad and clearly excluded certain 
information from discovery, it was not intended to exclude from discovery all relevant 
information and thereby preclude the possibility of proving negligence. See id. at 1089. Thus, 
the Court reversed the summary judgment granted to the hospital. 
Similarly, in In re Larrimore v. Vaughn Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., the Alabama 
Supreme Court faced a question involving the Alabama peer review statute which prevented 
discovery of credentialing and peer review documents such as written reports, records, 
correspondence, and materials concerning the accreditation or quality assurance or similar 
function of any hospital. 768 So. 2d 374 (Ala. 2000). See also Ala. Code 5 22-21-8. In arguing 
that the Court should allow discovery of credentialing information, the plaintiff asserted that her 
cause of action for negligent credentialing would be abrogated if she were not allowed to 
discover such information. See Larrimore, 768 So. 2d at 378-379. The Court disagreed and, 
relying on the reasoning of the Arizona Court of Appeals, held that the plaintiffs cause of action 
was not abrogated because the statute did not prevent her from obtaining information outside the 
peer review confidentiality provisions such as court records in previous malpractice claims, 
administrative records or testimony about a physician's education and training, and the hospital's 
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general credentialing or review procedure policies. See id. at 379-380 (citing Hurnana Hospital 
Desert Valley v. Superior Court, 742 P.2d 1382 (Ct. App. Az. 1987)). 
The same result was reached by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Sun Health 
Corp. v. Superior Court, 70 P.3d 444 (Az. Ct. App. 2003). In Sun Health, the Court of Appeals 
upheld the district court's decision that certain documents requested in discovery were privileged 
under Arizona's peer review statute which protected information and documents prepared in 
connection with a peer review (including credentialing) investigation. See id. at 446-447. In 
response to the plaintiffs argument that such a result abrogated her cause of action, the Arizona 
Court of Appeals stated that the cause of action was not abrogated because the "plaintiff has 
reasonable alternative ways to obtain information without seeking privileged information." See 
id at 449. The Court noted that the plaintiff "can seek information outside the review process 
and information from the original sources including court records of previous malpractice claims 
and administrative records or testimony about the physician's education and training. A plaintiff 
can obtain discovery about the hospital's credentialing process . . . . and may retain experts to 
opine on any issues that may arise." See id As such, the plaintiffs cause of action was not 
abrogated. See id. 
Mr. Harrison recognizes, as did the Courts cited above, that the peer review 
statute serves to insulate documents, discussions, communications, and opinions created or 
furnished to a peer review committee from discovery in a civil snit. Mr. I-Iarrison also 
recognizes that the peer review statute protects hospitals and doctors from liability for providing 
information for peer review activities and for using those inaterials in peer review activities. 
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However, nothing in the Idaho peer review statute eliminates the hospital's duty to ensure that 
physicians practicing in the facility are fully qualified and able to care for patients. Mr. Harrison 
recognizes that, in practice, a large majority of negligent credentialing cases brought in Idaho 
will likely fail to survive summary judgment due to the inability of the plaintiff obtain privileged 
peer review information and the lack of any evidence available from sources outside the 
credentialing process. This is not that case. Here, Mr. Harrison can present an abundance of 
evidence, supported by expert testimony, regarding SARMC's negligence in granting Dr. 
Hartford's reappointment privileges in the spring of 2003. Specifically, Mr. Harrison intends to 
present evidence which includes Dr. Hartford's disciplinary record with the Idaho Board of 
Medicine, including Dr. Hartford's chronic propensity to violate the stipulated disciplinary 
orders and Dr. Hartford's history of drug and alcohol abuse documented within the Board of 
Medicine disciplinary records. Further, Mr. Harrison intends to present documents and findings 
from the Board of Medicine's proceedings against Dr. Hartford in May of 2004. All of this 
evidence is completely outside the Idaho peer review statute and is therefore available to prove 
Mr. Harrison's case. 
Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Harrison is able to produce evidence obtained 
from sources other than documents protected by the peer review privilege, Mr. Harrison must be 
allowed to prosecute his claim for negligence in the credentialing and privileging of Dr. 
Hartford. To hold otherwise would insulate any hospital from liability even if it did to 
ensure that a physician was qualified to perform surgery at the hospital despite the immense and 
irreparable harm likely to be caused by such an unqualified or unfit physician. Adopting 
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SARMC's position and refusing to recognize a claim for negligent credentialing would, in effect, 
mean that a hospital could allow a person without a medical degree - let alone a medical license 
-to perform surgery in the hospital's facility and the hospital would face no civil liability. Such 
a result cannot have been intended by the Idaho Legislature. As the Court in Stottlemyer v. 
Ghramm noted: "It is clearly foreseeable that if a hospital opens its facilities to demonstrably 
incompetent professionals, including independent contractors, that injury to patients will occur 
. . . [Tlhe hospital cannot knowingly or negligently permit one lacking the minimal professional 
credentials to use its facilities to provide services which pose such an inherent danger of injury." 
60 Va. Cir. 474,478-79 (2001). The Court further stated: 
Therefore, it is not surprising that all hospitals have a process for 
credentialing physicians and they are required to do so in order to 
obtain and retain their accreditation.. .This is most certainly true in 
today's medical environment, where many patients have no 
practical option in choosing surgeons, anesthesiologists, 
pulmonologists, nurses, etc. who will provide service. It would 
seem only logical and commonsensical that a patient being 
wheeled on a gurney into an operating room and looking up at 
four (4) to eight (8) heavily masked professionals standing in 
front of millions of dollars of high-tech medical equipment 
would normally assume that someone has made an effort to 
assure that these people meet minimal professional standards. 
See id. at 479 (emphasis added). The Court further recognized that a majority of states have 
recognized some form of negligent credentialing/supervision cause of action against a hospital in 
a medical malpractice case. See id. at 477. 
In this case, Mr. Harrison went to the SARMC emergency room seeking treatment 
and trusting that someone at SARMC had, in fact, made an effort to ensure that those physicians 
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providing treatment to Mr. Harrison during his hospitalization would meet minimal professional 
standards. Sadly, SARMC failed in that duty by credentialing Dr. I-Iartford. As such, Mr. 
Harrison respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District Court's decision denying Mr. 
Harrison's Motion to Amend and remand this case for the purpose of allowing Mr. Harrison to 
pursue his claim. 
6. - Granting SARMC immunitv from civil liabilitv does not serve the 
p p  
contradicts the Durposes o f  the Act. 
Finally, the Court should reverse the District Court's decision because granting 
SARMC immunity from civil liability for negligent credentialing does not serve the purposes of 
the Idaho Peer Review Act ("Act"). As the District Court recognized, it is a "universal rule of 
statutory construction that a statute must be construed in the light of its intent and purpose." 
DeRousse v. Higginson, 95 Idaho 173, 176, 505 P.2d 321, 324 (1973). Idaho Code 9 39-1392 
sets forth the Statement of Policy for the Act as follows: 
To encourage research, discipline and medical study by certain 
health care organizations for the purposes of reducing morbidity 
and mortality, enforcing and improving the standards of medical 
practice in the state of Idaho, certain records of such health care 
organizations shall be confidential and privileged as set forth in 
this chapter. 
I.C. 9 39-1392. Thus, the clear statement of policy from the Legislature regarding the enactment 
of the Idaho Peer Review Act was to reduce the morbidity and mortality rates and enforce and 
imurove standards of medical practice in the State of Idaho. In order to encourage those 
purposes, the Legislature mandated that certain records of peer review committees remain 
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confidential and privileged in order to allow the free exchange of ideas and opinions within and 
between health care organizations. Thus, peer review committees (including credentialing 
committees) are free to discuss particular decisions and actions taken by physicians, create 
studies and statistics to track events, and otherwise have free and open discussions in order to 
frankly and honestly assess the standards of health care in the facility without fear that such 
documents or discussions will later be used as evidence in a lawsuit against a physician or a 
hospital. 
The 2003 amendments which added credentialing activities to the types of 
activities protected by the Act, did not change the intent and purpose of the statute. It is 
reasonable and understandable that a hospital may be able to make important and difficult 
decisions regarding the credentialing of a physician when discussions and documents created by 
or used by the committee are not subject to disclosure. However, granting absolute immunity to 
a hospital for any credentialing decision does not hrther the purposes of the statute. It simply 
cannot be argued that relieving a hospital of all liability for credentialing decisions somehow 
furthers the purpose of enforcing and improving the standards of medical practice in this state. 
By removing any threat of civil liability to a patient, the hospital, in fact, has less reason and 
motivation to enforce and improve the standards of medical practice. SARMC, like all hospitals, 
is a business which must make decisions which impact its finances on a regular basis. Without 
civil responsibility, a hospital could make a financial decision that credentialing physicians with, 
at best, questionable qualifications will provide more patients to the hospital and, therefore, 
provide more income to the hospital. 
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In the proceedings below, Mr. Harrison provided a supplemental citation of 
authority to the District Court identifying the thirty-two states which had expressly recognized a 
cause of action for negligent credentialing by a hospital. R.Vol. I, p. 178-180. The 
Supplemental Citation of Authorities further identified the only two states which had expressly 
found no cause of action for negligent credential. R. Vol. I, p. 181. However, both of these 
states, Texas and Kansas, have statutes which unambiguously abrogate such a cause of action. 
Id In the District Court's opinion denying the Motion to Amend, the District Court rejected Mr. 
Harrison's supplemental citation of authority on the grounds that none of the states had statutes 
identical to the Act. R. Vol. I, p. 199-202. Mr. Harrison has never argued that each of the states 
which have recognized a cause of action for negligent credentialing have peer review statutes 
identical to the Act. Rather, the purpose in providing the Supplemental Citation of Authority 
was to inform the District Court that, despite the fact that nearly every state has some form of 
protection for peer review activities, the vast majority of courts have found a cause of action for 
negligent credentialing and, the only two states which have rejected such a claim have done so 
based upon very express language abrogating such a claim. The fact that so many states have 
recognized a cause of action for negligent credentialing is further support for Mr. Harrison's 
position that valid public policy reasons exist for finding that Idaho Code 5 39-1392c does not 
provide absolute immunity for negligent credentialing claims. 
Finally, even if this Court believes that the statute unambiguously provides 
immunity for credentialing activities based on the "use of '  language in the immunity statute, the 
Court should nevertheless reverse the District Court's decision. Where the language of a statute 
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is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative 
intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. See George W Watkins 
Family, 118 Idaho at 539-40, 797 P.2d at 1387-88. In this case, as is clear from the legislative 
intent behind both the Act and specifically the civil immunity provision, granting SARMC 
absolute liability for all credentialing activities is not only contrary to the clearly expressed 
legislative intent behind the Act, but will also lead to absurd results. As such, Mr. Harrison 
respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District Court's decision that Idaho Code S, 39- 
1392c provides absolute immunity to SARMC for its decision to credential Dr. Hartford and 
remand this case for trial on this issue. 
B. The District Court Erred in Granting the Motion for Protective Order 
Related to the Subpoena for the Exhibits to the Disciplinary Proceeding 
Before the Idaho Board of Medicine. 
In the course of litigation in this matter, Mr. Harrison issued a subpoena to the 
Idaho State Board of Medicine, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), seeking the 
documents entered as exhibits to the record of the administrative disciplinary hearing regarding 
the suspension of Dr. Hartford's medical license in May of 2006. See R. Vol. I, p. 326, Exhibit 
13 (Affidavit of Keely Duke in Support of Dr. Jeffrey Hartford's Motion for Protective Order), 
Exhibit A (Deposition of Mary Leonard), p. 5, LL 3-12. At the deposition, counsel for Dr. 
Hartford and counsel for Dr. Binnion objected to the exhibits to the administrative hearing. See 
R. Vol. I, p. 326, Exhibit 13, Exhibit A, pp. 14-17. Dr. Hartford then filed a protective order 
seeking an order preventing the disclosure of those exhibits on the grounds that they included 
confidential and privileged records relating to Dr. Hartford's substance abuse treatment. See R. 
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Vol. I, p. 132. After briefing and argument, the discovery master appointed by the District Court 
in this matter issued a Recommendation on Dr. Hartford's Motion for Protective Order and the 
District Court granted the Protective Order on April 3, 2006. See R. Vol. I ,  p. 170. In granting 
the Order, the District Court held that Dr. Hartford did not waive any claim of privilege 
regarding those treatment records. Id. For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Harrison respectfully 
asserts that the District Court erred in finding such documents to be privileged and requests that 
Court reverse this decision and, should the negligent credentialing claim against SARMC 
proceed, order that the exhibits to ihe Board of Medicine disciplinary proceeding be produced. 
I .  - Dr. Hartford has waived anv privilege as to documents admitted as 
exhibits to the Idaho State Board o f  Medicine discialinarv 
proceeding. 
In the proceedings below, the District Court held that Dr. Hartford did not waive 
any privilege as to his treatment records presented as exhibits to the Board of Medicine 
disciplinary proceedings. In so holding, the District Court relied upon the Court's earlier Order 
Denying Motion to Compel in Part, issued August 5,2005. R. Vol. I, p. 170. In this Order, the 
Court denied Mr. Harrison's motion to compel Dr. Hartford to produce any and all records 
related to substance abuse treatment. R. Vol. I, pp. 109-1 14. In so holding, the Court stated that 
Dr. Hartford had not waived his privilege based on his disclosure of those treatment records to 
the Board of Medicine. See R. Vol, 11, p. 109. 
Idaho law is clear that the proceedings, evidence, testimony, and showings related 
to an Idaho Board of Medicine disciplinary proceeding are discoverable. While Idaho Code 5 9- 
340C limits the disclosure of certain Board of Medicine proceedings pursuant to public records 
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request, Idaho Code 5 9-343(3) provides, in relevant part, that "Nothing contained in sections 9- 
337 through 9-348, Idaho Code shall limit the availability of documents and records for 
discovery in the normal course of judicial or administrative adjudicatory proceedings, subject to 
the law and rules of evidence and of discovery governing such proceedings." Therefore, the 
plain language of the Idaho statutes provide that all of the evidence, testimony, documents, 
records, showings, and proceedings of the Idaho Board of Medicine's formal disciplinary 
proceedings are discoverable in a civil lawsuit subject only to the law, rules of evidence and of 
roles of discovery governing such a proceeding. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the discovery of all relevant 
information that is not otherwise privileged. See I.R.C.P. 26. In this case, the exhibits to the 
Board of Medicine disciplinary proceeding are clearly relevant to Mr. Harrison's claim of 
negligent credentialing against SARMC. Based on the testimony provided regarding these 
records, Mr. Harrison believes they will assist in demonstrating Dr. Hartford's long history of 
drug and alcohol abuse as well as his continued inability to abstain from the use of drugs and 
alcohol. Mr. Harrison believes these exhibits will also assist in proving that Dr. Hartford had a 
long history of lying about his drug and alcohol abuse. Therefore, because the exhibits are 
relevant to this cause of action, they are discoverable absent a viable claim of privilege. 
The District Court held that Dr. Hartford had a valid claim of privilege to these 
records and that the privilege was not waived by his participation in the Board of Medicine's 
disciplinary proceeding. Waiver of a privilege with respect to confidential medical information 
can occur when the patient voluntarily consents to the disclosure of such information. See, e.g., 
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Pearce v. Ollie, 121 Idaho 539,560-61,826 P.2d 888,909-910 (1992). In this case, Dr. Hartford 
voluntarily consented to the admission of the treatment records to the Board of Medicine 
proceedings. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 20 (Affidavit of Erica S. Phillips in Opposition to 
Defendant Jeffrey Hartford, M.D.'s Motion for Protective Order), Exhibit B (Board of Medicine 
Transcript) pp. 6-8. At the Board of Medicine hearing, the hearing officer began the proceedings 
by asking if any documentary evidence would be offered in the course of the hearing. See id., p. 
6, LL 1-4. Dr. Hartford's counsel responded that such evidence would be offered, and would 
consist of "primarily the documents that are part of the records of the Board of Medicine and for 
the PRN - Physicians Recovery Network - pursuant to the consent by my client to have those 
records[.]" See id., p. 6, LL 6-3. 
The District Court held that any treatment records admitted as exhibits to the 
Board of Medicine proceeding were either privileged disclosures or compelled disclosures and 
therefore did not constitute a waiver. See R. Vol. I, pp. 109 and 170. However, the transcript of 
the Board of Medicine proceedings does not support this argument. First, Dr. Hartford's counsel 
at the Board of Medicine proceeding recognized that the Board of Medicine proceeding was a 
public proceeding and requested that the exhibits be sealed so that they would not be subject to a 
public records request. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 20, Exhibit B, p. 6, LL 15-24. Further, Dr. 
Hartford stipulated to allow the Board of Medicine staff to elicit testimony regarding the contents 
of the records. See id., p. 7, LL 12-21. Thus, it is apparent that Dr. Hartford recognized the fact 
that the Board of Medicine proceeding was a public proceeding that would become part of the 
Board of Medicine's public record. Although a waiver of a privilege does not occur if the 
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disclosure is itself a privileged communication, it is impossible to believe that Dr. Hartford had 
any reasonable basis to believe that the admission of the treatment records as well as testimony 
regarding those treatment records within the Board of Medicine disciplinary proceeding was a 
privileged communication. Rather, the record clearly demonstrates that Dr. Hartford was well 
aware of the public nature of the disciplinary hearing and took steps to ensure only that the 
treatment records would not be subject to a public records request. Therefore, Dr. Hartford's 
stipulation to the admission of the treatment records in the Board of Medicine disciplinary 
proceeding cannot have been a privileged disclosure. 
Further, the disclosure of Dr. Hartford's treatment records within the Board of 
Medicine proceedings carniot have been compelled. First, there is no evidence that Dr. Hartford 
was, in fact, compelled to disclose the treatment records at the Board of Medicine hearing. The 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that a general obligation to appear and answer 
questions truthfully pursuant to a subpoena does not convert otherwise voluntary statements into 
compelled ones. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984). Rather, a witness's 
answer is compelled only if he is required to answer over his valid claim of privilege. See id. 
Therefore, the fact that Dr. Hartford may have been obligated to appear at the Board of Medicine 
proceedings does not convert his otherwise voluntary disclosures into compelled disclosures. 
In order to establish that the disclosure of the treatment records within the Board of 
Medicine proceeding was compelled, Dr. Hartford must first establish that he asserted the 
privilege as to the treatment records and that that records were admitted over his valid claim of 
privilege. See, e.g., Rambus v. InJineon Technologies, AG, 220 F.R.D. 264,275 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
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Here, Dr. Hartford has failed to make any such showing and, in fact, the record is very clear that 
Dr. Hartford stipulated the admissibility of all of the exhibits offered by Idaho State Board of 
Medicine staff, which included the treatment records he now seeks to protect as privileged. See 
R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 20, Exhibit £3, p. 7, line 23 - p. 8, line 25. There is nothing in the 
Board of Medicine record that provides any indication that Dr. Hartford objected to the 
admissibility of the treatment records on the grounds of privilege. See id. Nor is there any 
provision of the Idaho statute governing the Board of Medicine proceedings which indicates that 
any claim of privilege would not apply to Board of Medicine disciplinary proceedings. See I.C. 
$5 54-1806 and 54-1837. Simply put, Dr. Hartford made a voluntary decision to consent to the 
admission of his treatment records as exhibits to the Board of Medicine proceeding. As such, he 
waived any claim of privilege as to those exhibits and Mr. Harrison is entitled to discovery of 
those exhibits. See, e.g., Weinrich v. Abington Memorial Hospital, 60 Pa. D. & c.4" 427 (Pa. 
Dist. Ct. 2001) (holding that physician waived privilege as to psychotherapy treatment records 
by voluntarily testifying about treatment at hearing before Board of Occupation and Professional 
Affairs hearing to determine whether his medical license should be revoked). Because Dr. 
Hartford waived any claim of privilege as to the exhibits admitted into the record at the Board of 
Medicine proceeding, Mr. Harrison is entitled to discover those documents pursuant to Idaho 
Code $$ 9-393(3) and 54-1837(e). 
Finally, even if the provision of substance abuse treatment records as exhibits to 
the Board of Medicine disciplinary proceedings was somehow a privileged or compelled 
communication, any claim of continued privilege cannot stand in light of the fact that Dr. 
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Hartford stipulated that testimony could be presented regarding the contents of the treatment 
records at the Board of Medicine hearing. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 20, Exhibit B, p. 7, LL 
12-21. The record is also clear that Dr. Hartford voluntarily testified under examination by his 
attorney at the Board of Medicine proceeding. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 20, Exhibit B, pp. 
356-452. Dr. Hartford's testimony included information regarding his treatment at various 
substance abuse treatment centers. See id. At no time did Dr. Hartford assert a claim of 
privilege as to his treatment records or his confidential communications with the physicians 
treating his substance abuse problems. 
The record further reflects that Dr. Hartford was fully aware that the disciplinary 
proceeding was a public proceeding and that the testimony would not be kept confidential by the 
Board of Medicine. The only concerns expressed by Dr. Hartford related to the actual treatment 
records and Dr. Hartford only requested that the documents be sealed so as to be protected from 
disclosure pursuant to a public records request. Dr. Hartford cannot claim a privilege as to 
testimony and records that he allowed to be entered without objection and which he voluntarily 
gave to the hearing officer. 
Additionally, the information that is publicly available on the Board 01 
Medicine's website includes Dr. Hartford's stipulations with the Board of Medicine, the 
proposed findings, conclusions of law, and proposed order by the hearing officer, the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and order from the Board of Medicine, and the amended findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and order from the Board of Medicine. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 
20, Exhibit C (Documents publicly available on the Idaho Board of Medicine's website). The 
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hearing officer's proposed findings cite extensively to the transcript and exhibits to the 
disciplinary proceeding and includes quotes and other references to Dr. Hartford's substance 
abuse treatment history. See R. Vol. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 12, Exhibit B. Dr. Harford cannot assert 
any legitimate claim to the confidentiality of his substance abuse treatment when such 
information is included in documents available to anybody with access to the Board of 
Medicine's website. While Mr. Harrison recognizes the public policy behind ensuring the 
confidentiality of communications made to physicians and psychotherapists in the course of 
substance abuse treatment, that public policy is eliminated when the information is voluntarily 
provided in a public hearing and, therefore, becomes part of the public record accessible by 
anybody with a computer and internet connection. As such, Mr. Harrison respectfully requests 
that the Court reverse the District Court's decision granting the Motion for Protective Order and 
allow the production of those exhibits. 
C. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to Dr. 
Binnion on the Issue of Causation. 
As was set forth in the Course of Proceedings, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to Dr. Binnion based on the District Court's determination that Mr. Harrison had failed 
to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Dr. Binnion's breaches of the 
standard of care had caused any damage to Mr. Harrison. The primary basis for the Court's 
decision was that Dr. Laureno, one of Mr. Harrison's causation experts testified that, had the rate 
of sodium replacement been slowed considerably at 6:00 a.m. when the lab report showed a 
sodium level of 105, he could not say that it was more likely than not that Mr. Harrison would 
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have suffered from CPM. R. Vol. 11, pp. 295-299. According to the District Court, because Dr. 
Binnion's care of Mr. Harrison ceased at 3:25 a.m., and the CPM might have been prevented had 
the sodium replacement been slowed considerably at 6:00 a.m., Dr. Binnion's breach of the local 
standard of care in her treatment of Mr. Harrison could not have caused damage to Mr. Harrison. 
See id. 
Mr. Harrison respectfully requests that the District Court's decision granting 
sumlnary judgment to Dr. Binnion be reversed because there is sufficient evidence in the record 
to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. Specifically, Mr. I-Iarrison's 
emergency room physician expert, Dr. Paul Navar, testified that Dr. Binnion breached the local 
standard of care by failing to slow the rate of sodium replacement at the time Dr. Binnion 
received the initial lab report showing a sodium level of 96. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, 
(Affidavit of Patricia M. Olsson in Support of D. Lee Binnion's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment), Exhibit A (Deposition of Paul Navar, M.D.), p. 61, LL 5-1 1. Dr. Navar further 
testified that the applicable standard of care was that the sodium level should be increased no 
more than .5 milliequivalents per hour, not to exceed 10 to 12 milliequivalents in a 24 hour 
period. See id, at p. 64, LL 5-12; p. 71, LL 5-14; p. 74, LL 4-17. Dr. Navar also testified that 
Dr. Binnion's breaches of the local standard of care as set forth above were a substantial factor in 
causing the condition of Central Pontine Mvelinolvsis in Mr. Harrison. See id. at p. 49, line 13 - 
p. 50, line 19. 
In turn, Dr. Laureno, Mr. Harrison's primary causation expert, has testified that 
Mr. Harrison suffers from CPM and that the CPM resulted from the rapid rise in sodium level 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 46 
which was incurred during his hospital visit to SARMC. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 30 
(Affidavit of Erica S. Phillips in Opposition to Defendant D. Lee Binnion, M.D.'s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment), Exhibit A (Deposition of Robert Laureno, M.D.), p. 46, line 6 - p. 
49, line 4, and Paragraph 1 of Exhibit 3 to the deposition. In fact, Dr. Laureno testified that there 
was no other cause of the CPM than the rapid elevatioil of the sodium level in Mr. Harrison's 
case. See id. at p. 50, LL 9-18. Thus, the testimony establishes that Dr. Binnion breached the 
local standard of care by failing to properly slow the rate of sodium replacement after receiving 
the initial lab report showing severe hyponatremia and that such breach was a substantial factor 
in causing Harrison's injuries. The testimony further establishes that the cause of Mr. Harrison's 
CPM was the rapid replacement of sodium. Thus, there is expert testimony that Dr. Binnion's 
breach of the standard of care was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's CPM. 
The District Court concluded that Mr. Harrison had failed to establishe causation 
because there was no expert testimony that, had the sodium replacement been slowed at 6:00 
a.m., Mr. Harrison still would have suffered from CPM. Thus, the District Court effectively 
concluded that because the damage might have been avoided by another party taking different 
action, there is no causation between Dr. Binnion's breach of the standard of care and Mr. 
Harrison's damages. However, Idaho law does not require that a plaintiff establish that the 
negligence of a physician was the sole cause of the plaintiffs damages. Rather, when there are 
multiple possible causes for a plaintiffs injury, the proper causation standard is that the doctor's 
negligence is a proximate cause of the injury if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the 
damage. See Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284,288, 127 P.3d 187, 191 (2005). In this case, 
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Dr. Navar testified that, in his expert opinion, Dr. Binnion's breach of the local standard of care 
was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's CPM. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 20, 
Exhibit A (Deposition of Dr. Paul Navar), p. 49, line 13 - p. 50, line 19. Thus, the fact that Dr. 
Hartford or somebody else might have been able to prevent the onset of CPM by taking some 
hypothetical action to slow the rate of sodium replacement at 6:00 a.m. on November 15, 2003, 
does not mean that Dr. Binnion's breaches of the standard of care as testified to by Dr. Navar 
were not a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's damages. 
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the type of "but for" causation test Dr. 
Binnion attempts to apply to this case in Newberry, supra. In Newberry, the plaintiff sought 
treatment from the defendant physician for an injury to his eye. The physician provided 
treatment and antibiotics and sent the plaintiff home. Approximately two days later, the plaintiff 
suffered a complete loss of vision in his eye and sought emergency medical treatment. Surgery 
was ultimately performed and the plaintiff suffered permanent total vision loss in his eye. The 
cause was determined to be a bacterial infection which began at the time of the injury. See 
Newberry, 127 P.3d at 189-90, 142 Idaho at 286-87. 
After trial which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, the physician appealed and 
argued that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the substantial factor test. The Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected the physician's argument stating that where more than one cause is 
asserted, the substantial factor test is appropriate. See id. at 288, 127 P.3d at 191. In so holding 
the Court rejected the doctor's argument that the "but for" test was appropriate because there was 
only one cause of the injury to the plaintiff, namely the bacterial infection. The Court held that 
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the doctor's argument ignored the fact that there was evidence presented that the doctor's 
negligence contributed to the injury. See id. at 289, 127 P.3d at 192. The Court also stated that 
the doctor was free to argue to the jury that he was not negligent or that his negligence was not a 
substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs damages, but because there was evidence that the 
negligence was a possible contributing cause, the substantial factor test was appropriate. See id. 
In this case, Dr. Navar has testified that Dr. Binnion's breach of the local standard 
of care was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison to suffer from CPM. Dr. Navar 
specifically testified that Dr. Binnion's failure to adjust the rate of correction to comply with the 
standard of care of no more than .5 milliequivalents per hour upon receipt of the initial lab report 
showing a sodium level of 96 was a breach of the standard of care and that such breaches were a 
substantial factor in causing Harrison's injuries. Additionally, Dr. Laureno has testified that the 
sole cause of the CPM was the rapid elevation of sodium levels. As such, Mr. Harrison has 
presented evidence that Dr. Binnion contributed to the rapid rise in Mr. Harrison's sodium level 
by failing to reduce the rate of sodium replacement upon receipt of the initial lab value showing 
a sodium level of 96. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Dr. Binnion's actions 
were a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's injuries. Like the doctor in Newberiy, Dr. 
Binnion is free to argue to the jury that she was not negligent or that her negligence was not a 
substantial factor in causing the injuries to Mr. Harrison. But, where, as here, evidence has been 
presented that Dr. Binnion's actions were a contributing cause to the harm suffered by Mr. 
Harrison, summary judgment is not appropriate just because Dr. Binnion's action may not have 
been the sole cause of Mr. Harrison's damages. 
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In the Order granting summary judgment, the District Court asserted that Dr. 
Navar's testimony that Dr. Binnion breached the local standard of care by failing to properly 
communicate within her physician's orders, at the time they were written, her concerns about the 
rapid elevation of sodium and that all laboratory values be immediately communicated to the 
attending physician upon receipt by attending nursing staff was immaterial because there was no 
testimony that such breach actually caused Mr. Harrison's CPM. See R. Vol. 11, p. 296. 
However, as was set forth previously, Dr. Navar did testify that the breaches of the local standard 
of care by Dr. Binnion were a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's damages. See R. Vol. 
11, p. 327, Exhibit 20, Exhibit A, p. 49, line 13 - p. 50, line 19. 
In fact, Dr. Binnion's failure to properly communicate her concerns to Dr. 
Hartford and the nursing staffhighlights the fundamental flaw in the argument that Dr. Binnion's 
actions were not a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's damages. The District Court's 
decision was based upon the assumption that the sodium replacement rate could have been 
slowed considerably by Dr. Hartford at 6:00 a.m. when the next labs were available showing a 
sodium level of 105 - a 9 milliequivalent per liter increase in 6 hours. See R. Vol. 11, pp. 297- 
298. However, Dr. Binnion never established that this lab value was reported to Dr. Hartford at 
6:00 a.m. in a manner which would have allowed him to make any kind of adjustment. In fact, 
Dr. Hartford testified that he did not visit Mr. I-Iarrison for the first time until approximately 
11:OO a.m. on November 15, 2003. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 30, Exhibit B (Deposition of 
Jeffrey Hartford, M.D.), p. 169, LL 10-22. Dr. Hartford further testified that he never recalled 
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seeing or receiving a lab report of 105 sodium level during his visit with Mr. Harrison on the 
morning of November 15,2003. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 30, Exhibit B, p. 174, LL 2-5. 
Therefore, Mr. Harrison has established that Dr. Binnion's failure to properly 
provide written orders instructing the nurses to immediately call Dr. Hartford when the 6:00 a.m. 
lab values were available was also a contributing cause to Mr. Harrison's injuries. Simply put, 
Mr. Harrison has provided evidence that Dr. Binnion's breach of the local standard of care in 
failing to properly communicate the importance of monitoring the sodium values and 
communicating those values to the attending physician was a substantial factor in causing Mr. 
Harrison's injuries. Certainly a reasonable jury could infer from the testimony provided that had 
Dr. Binnion properly communicated within her physician's orders at the time they were written, 
her concerns about the rapid elevation of sodium and ordered that all laboratory values be 
immediately communicated to the attending physician upon receipt by attending nursing staff, 
both the nursing staff and Dr. Hartford would have been aware of the concerns about the rapid 
elevation of sodium, Dr. Hartford would have been contacted at 6:00 am regarding the sodium 
level of 105 and the rate of sodium replacement would have been slowed, thereby preventing the 
damage to Mr. Harrison from the resulting onset of CPM. See Sheridan v. St. Luke S Reg'l Med. 
Ctr., Inc., 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001) (holding that a jury could reasonably and naturally 
infer from a chain of circumstances that nurse's negligence was a proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs injury). 
Finally, Dr. Navar also testified that Dr. Binnion breached the local standard of 
care by failing to ensure that Mr. Harrison was admitted to the ICU unit. See R. Vo1. IT, p. 327, 
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Exhibit 25, Exhibit A, p. 49, line 13 -p. 50, line 19. Dr. Navar testified that Mr. Harrison should 
have been in the ICU unit where he could have more frequent blood draws to more closely 
monitor his sodium levels to ensure that the levels were not rising at a rate inore than .5 
milliequivalents per hour. See id. at p. 88, LL 2-16. Additionally, Dr. James Souza, a physician 
who is board certified in pulmonary and critical care and who worked in the SARMC intensive 
care unit as an intensivist in November of 2003, testified that the standard of care for raising the 
sodium level of a severely hyponatremic patient such as Ray Harrison in Boise, Idaho, in 
November of 2003 was no more than .5 milliequivalents per hour, not to exceed 10 
milliequivalents per day. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 30, Exhibit C (Deposition of James 
Souza, M.D.), p. 19, line 12 - p. 21, line 21. Dr. Souza also testified that he would have 
admitted Mr. Harrison to the ICU in order to ensure that Mr. Harrison's rate of sodium 
replacement was properly monitored. See id. at p. 14, LL 8-21. Thus, the testimony above 
establishes that Dr. Binnion's breach of the local standard of care by failing to ensure that Mr. 
Harrison was admitted to the ICU unit was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's injuries 
because, had he been admitted to the ICU, the testimony of Dr. Navar and Dr. Souza demonstrate 
that the sodium levels would have been closely monitored and that the rate of correction would 
not have exceeded .5 milliequivalents per hour. As such, Mr. Harrison did present evidence 
sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Dr. Binnion's breaches of the 
local standard of care were a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's injuries. See Shevidan, 
135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001). Therefore, Mr. Harrison respectfully requests that the Court 
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reverse the District Court's decision granting summary judgment to Dr. Binnion and remand this 
case for trial on this claim. 
IY. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant respecthlly requests that the Court 
reverse the District Court's decision denying the Motion for Leave to Amend regarding the claim 
of negligent credentialing against SARMC; reverse the District Court's decision granting the 
Protective Order as to the Board of Medicine exhibits; and reverse the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment to Dr. Binnion on the issue of causation. 
4- DATED this 1 a day of June, 2008. 
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC 
By: 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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